

THE VIEW OF THE BEKASI MUSLIM MIDDLE CLASS TOWARD IDENTITY POLITICS REVIEWED FROM ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBERSHIP AND EDUCATIONAL ASPECTS

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Abstracts

This research was motivated by the emergence of various movements after the blasphemy event carried out by DKI Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama. The campaign led by a group called the Muslim middle class brought several demands. The participation of the Muslim middle class is exciting to study considering that this class is seen as a consumptive class compared to its role in the political field. The presence of the middle class in the political arena is significant in the process of democratization, especially in terms of political participation.

But on the other hand, there is an allegation of the strengthening of the Muslim middle-class identity politics. The unit of analysis in this study is teaching staff (lecturers) in Islamic tertiary institutions in the Bekasi City area. The research method used is a quantitative study with a questionnaire as a data collection tool. Data analysis techniques use cross tabulation. The number of samples in this study was 100 people with a confidence level of 95% and a margin of error of 10%. The questionnaire results that there are differences between respondents who are members of religious organizations in looking at the participation of Muslim middle class and identity politics. Whereas gender and education level have no difference in looking at participation and identity politics.

Keywords: Participation, Muslim Middle Class, Political Identity, Different Analysis

I. INTRODUCTION

The "blasphemy" incident that struck Jakarta Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) caused a movement carried out by many Muslims. The campaign began with the Aksi Bela Islam on October 14, 2016, followed on November 4, 2016, and December 2, 2016, which became known as the Gerakan 411 and the Gerakan 212. The action demanded that Ahok be tried and imprisoned. The emergence of these action movements coincided with the implementation of the DKI Jakarta Regional Election which was followed by candidate pairs Anies Rasyied Baswedan - Sandiaga Salahudin Uno, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama - Djarot Saiful Hidayat, and Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono - Sylviana Murni. The existence of Gerakan Aksi Bela Islam raises a variety of predictions, such as the fading of religious authority (Sholikin, 2018; Burhani, 2016); political communication built by Muslims (Abdullah, 2017); and the rise of identity politics (Sari, 2016; Khamdan and Wiharyani, 2018).

Talking about identity politics in Indonesia is more related to issues of ethnicity, religion, ideology, and local interests represented by elites with their own needs (Maarif, 2012). Identity politics according to Abdillah (in Maarif, 2012) is a politics whose primary focus is study and its problems regarding differences based on physical body assumptions, political ethnicity or primordialism, and religious, belief, or language conflicts. Identity politics is present as a form of resistance by minority groups or marginalized due to failure to accommodate minority interests. In this case, identity politics is a means of delivering aspirations to minority groups. However, in the modern era, "stuttering" appears in understanding the increasingly pluralistic structure of society. As a result of the action of intolerance increases (Abdullah, 2017).

Related to the Islamic Defendant Action movement and its impressive follow-up is that the movement is dominated by middle-class urban Muslims (Wildan, 2016). A new generation has emerged in the form of a movement of Muslim intellectuals who are willing to let go of organizational barriers, leave the issue of *furu'* and not be ashamed to be criticized (<http://www.suara-media.com/2017/03/aksi-212-dan-5-fenomena-lahirnya.html> accessed on May 18, 2017).

Discussions about the Muslim middle class, in particular, are inseparable from the general understanding of the middle class. The application of the term 'class' to see the middle class in Indonesia raises caution. Bulkin (1984) uses the term 'middle class' to distinguish it from the middle class in Europe, where the middle class consists of intellectuals, students, newspaper leaders, indigenous entrepreneurs and traders, lawyers and other professional groups.

In the midst of difficulties in explaining the figure of the Indonesian middle class, Rofhani (2013) limits the middle-class group as a group that is economically above average, with a minimum level of education (S1), has a high level of mobility and accessibility and have the ability to choose as well as high bargaining power, rationality and life in urban areas, and most of them get general education (not religious schools) and the jobs they do as professionals who are not religious, for example, entrepreneurs, doctors, executive officers, lawyers, and others. Whereas according to Jati (2016), the middle class is a new class of society that displays the side of rationality, materiality, and intellectuality from the existence of an increasingly better economic life. Surya (2006)

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states that the middle class is professionals who have high education and skills, adequate income, the prestige of the profession, and jobs that are bound by personal ethics. In this case, the lecturer is included in the category. While the Muslim middle class means 'middle class' and 'Muslim'. According to Ali and Purwandi (2017), the Muslim middle class is a society that has power and also religiosity, where religious teachings determine the mindset and pattern of behavior.

According to Jati (2017), the Indonesian Muslim middle class has several unique characteristics. First, the Indonesian Muslim middle class is an exclusive group in the Indonesian middle class because they combine Islamic values and principles on the one hand and modernity on the other. Second, there is a link between the Muslim middle class and the global agenda through the concept of the ummah. Third, having the potential as a latent political force to deal with nationalist groups. Fourth, there is a desire to be recognized as a community group because it has been considered a marginal group.

An interesting phenomenon of the emergence of a consumptive middle class is the spirit of returning to religious life. Evidence of such obedience can be found such as crowded symbols, attributes, and recitation activities in public spaces, performing Umrah, Hajj, peci, headscarves, Koko clothes, hanging calligraphy, etc. (Arizal, 2016).

Linking the behavior of the middle class of the Muslim consumptive and the strengthening of adherence to the teachings of Islam have formed a new identity in Indonesia. Based on the problems that occurred, where there were incidents of blasphemy and the emergence of various action movements carried out by some Muslim groups, it was interesting to study the views of the Muslim middle class on political identity in terms of organizational membership and education aspects. This study aims to find out the differences in views of the Muslim middle class on political identity in terms of points of organizational membership and education.

II. METHODS

The subjects in this study were permanent lecturers of an Islamic university in Bekasi. The selection of lecturers as middle class refers to the criteria of the middle class according to Surya (2006), namely professionals who have high education and skills, adequate income, professional prestige and jobs that are bound by personal ethics. The sampling technique used was random sampling with 100 respondents. Data collection techniques are done by questionnaire, where respondents fill in some research questions. The data obtained were analyzed using quantitative methods. Quantitative analysis techniques are used to analyze surveys which are then presented in frequency tables and cross-tabulations by looking at percentage trends. The collected and structured data then analyzed to explain the differences in views of the Muslim middle class towards identity politics.

III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

To analyze whether there is a difference in seeing the participation of the middle class and identity politics formed, a T-test is carried out. The results obtained for sex are as follows:

Table 1. Analysis of T-Tests based on Sex

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		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper
Partisipasi Politik	Equal variances assumed	.590	.444	-.385	98	.701	-.45455	1.17972	-.279565	1.88656
	Equal variances not assumed			-.387	95.673	.700	-.45455	1.17411	-.278523	1.87614
Politik Identitas	Equal variances assumed	.074	.787	.981	98	.329	.69899	.71268	-.71530	2.11328
	Equal variances not assumed			.986	95.965	.326	.69899	.70856	-.70749	2.10547

Sumber: SPSS, data diolah, 2018

Based on the results of the T-test, it shows that there is no difference between Muslim middle-class men and women in seeing their political identity. The significance obtained is at >0.05, which is equal to 0.701 for political participation and 0.329 for political identity.

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Table 2. Analysis of T-Tests based on Member of Islamic Community Organization

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper
Partisipasi assumed	Equal variances assumed	.110	.741	1.287	98	.201	2.39530	1.86150	-1.2987	6.08940
Politik	Equal variances assumed			1.29	12.6	.21	2.395	1.852	-	6.40981
Politik assumed	Equal variances assumed	.471	.494	1.224	98	.224	1.38304	1.13011	-	3.62570
Identitas not assumed	Equal variances not assumed			1.168	12.301	.265	1.38304	1.18386	1.18939	3.95548

Sumber: SPSS, data diolah, 2018

For the T-Test for respondents who are members of Islamic community organizations and those who are not members, the results are higher than 0.05, namely for political participation of 0.201 and political identity of 0.224. This shows that there is no difference between those who are members of Islamic community organizations and those who are not members.

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Table 3. Analysis of T-Tests based on Member of Islamic Religious Organizations

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
								Lower	Upper	
Partisipasi assumed	Equal variances	1.310	.255	2.909	98	.004	3.32102	1.14176	5.58680	1.05524
	not assumed			-	94.6	.00	-	1.11650	-	-
Politik assumed	Equal variances	.044	.834	7.473	98	.000	4.30542	.57616	5.44879	3.16204
	not assumed			7.517	90.319	.000	4.30542	.57279	5.44332	3.16752

Sumber: SPSS, data diolah, 2018

The results of the T-Test for respondents who are members of Islamic-based religious organizations indicate a difference in viewing the participation of Muslim middle class and political identity. The results obtained for Muslim middle-class participation are 0.004 and 0,000 for political identity. Both are at <0.05.

Based on the findings of the study, it was shown that for gender, both middle-class men and women of the Muslim class did not appear to have differences in viewing political identity. This phenomenon is not surprising when looking at middle-class Muslim men and women. The Muslim middle class, on the one hand, shows its consumptive behavior, but on the other hand, shows its spiritual side, which is returning to religious life. Evidence of obedience can be seen from the use of divine attributes, such as caps, headscarves, koko clothes, and religious activities in public spaces, such as recitation, umrah, etc.

Middle-class Muslim women also experience the same condition. According to Rofhani (2017) that Islamic culture, especially among Muslim middle-class women, is experiencing a shift. They show a new culture that is different from what fundamentalists do with turban, veil, and robes with specific colors. In general, middle-class women are rational and modernist Muslims but still, adhere to normative religious values. Gatra Special Edition Lebaran (2011) writes about the growth of products and designs of Islamic attributes, such as hijab, clothing, salons, cosmetics, etc.

The next finding shows that in terms of membership of the Muslim middle class in Islamic community organizations there is no difference between those who are

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members and those who are not. The intended Islamic community organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah, and Persis. This is in line with the opinion of Sholikin (2018), which states that NU and Muhammadiyah are no longer the sole authority in matters of religion in Indonesia. Even NU and Muhammadiyah do not officially support the Aksi Bela Islam and tend to disagree and ban its members from carrying organizational attributes .

(<http://nasional.inilah.com/read/detail/2343444/muhammadiyah-apharga-aksi-212> and <https://www.tempo.co/read/fokus/2016/11/22/3390/rencana-demo-2-desember-warga-nu-dan-muhammadiyahdiminta-tak-ikut> accessed on January 26, 2017).

On the contrary, differences occur in the middle class who are members of religious organizations, such as taklim assemblies, study groups, and so on. Globalization and modernization have changed the moral behavior of the urban middle class. As a result, traditional Islamic ties are increasingly fading, but the influence of global Islam and trans-nationalism is getting stronger. In the past, kyai or ulama were figures who had authority in the religious field, but modernization has changed the celeb ustadz and website as the most authoritative entity. In the Aksi Bela Islam 411 and 212 followed by celebrity clerics such as Abdullah Gymnastiar, Subkhi Al-Bughury, and Felix Siauw who were popular among the urban middle class. So that their existence influences the course of the action (Wildan, 2016). This further confirms that there are differences in the views of the Muslim middle class who join religious organizations with those not in terms of identity politics.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on research findings where after the T-Test for every aspect related to identity politics shows only the factor of participation of the Muslim middle class in religious organizations that have differences between respondents who participated in religious organizations and those who did not participate. The gender factors and being members of Islamic community organizations have no difference.

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